This paper derives empirically implementable formulas for the incidence and efficiency costs of taxation that account for tax salience effects as well as other optimization errors. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the formulas imply that the economic incidence of a tax depends on its statutory incidence and that a tax can create deadweight loss even if it induces no change in demand. The results are derived using simple supply and demand diagrams and familiar notions of consumer and producer surplus. The approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust formulas because it does not require specification of a positive theory for why agents fail to optimize with respect to tax policies.
of "salience" on behavioral responses to commodity taxation. They …nd that commodity taxes that are included in the posted prices that consumers see when shopping (and are thus more salient) have much larger e¤ects on demand.
1 Kelly Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger Motivated by this empirical evidence, this paper analyzes the implications of salience e¤ects and other optimization errors for the welfare consequences of tax policy. The challenge 1 I use "tax salience" to refer to the visibility of the tax inclusive price. When taxes are included in the posted price, the total tax-inclusive price is more visible but the tax rate itself may be less clear. There is a longstanding theoretical literature on "…scal illusion" which discusses how the lack of visibility of tax rates may a¤ect voting behavior and the size of government (John S. Mill 1848). Unlike that literature, I de…ne salience in terms of the visibility of the tax inclusive price because I focus on behaviors that optimally depend on total tax inclusive prices rather than behaviors which depend on the tax rate itself.
in this analysis -as in behavioral public economics more generally -is the calculation of welfare when behavior is inconsistent with full optimization (B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel 2009, Jerry R. Green and Daniel Hojman 2009) . One approach to this problem is to specify a positive model for why agents deviate from full optimization and analyze welfare costs within that model. This is the approach taken by Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007) , who derive formulas for the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of taxes in a bounded rationality model of tax salience. Although useful in obtaining some insights into welfare implications, this approach has the shortcoming of relying on particular assumptions about what drives deviations from full optimization. Bounded rationality is not the only model of inattention; models of forgetfulness or cue theories of attention could also generate salience e¤ects, and could potentially lead to di¤erent welfare implications.
In this paper, I develop an alternative method of characterizing the welfare consequences of taxation when agents optimize imperfectly that does not rely on a speci…c positive model of behavior. The approach rests upon two general assumptions: (1) tax policies a¤ect welfare only through their e¤ects on the consumption bundle chosen by the agent and (2) consumption choices when prices are fully salient -e.g., when there are no taxes -are consistent with full optimization. Under these assumptions, I derive formulas for the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of taxation that depend only on the empirically observed demand function and not on the underlying model which generates that demand function. Intuitively, there are two demand curves that together are su¢ cient statistics for welfare calculations when individuals make optimization errors: the tax-demand curve, which tells us how demand varies with taxes that are not included in posted prices, and the price-demand curve, which tells us how demand varies as (fully salient) posted prices change. I use the tax-demand curve to determine the e¤ect of the tax on behavior and then use the price-demand curve to calculate the e¤ect of that change in behavior on welfare. The price-demand curve can be used to recover the agent's underlying preferences and calculate welfare because it is generated by optimizing behavior.
The bene…ts of this approach to welfare analysis are its simplicity and adaptability. The formulas for excess burden and incidence can be derived using supply and demand diagrams and familiar notions of consumer and producer surplus. The formulas di¤er from the stan-dard Harberger (1964) expressions by a single factor -the ratio of the compensated tax elasticity to the compensated price elasticity. Thus, one can calculate the (partial equilibrium) deadweight cost and incidence of any tax policy by estimating both the tax and price elasticities instead of just the tax elasticity as in the existing empirical literature. Although the welfare analysis is motivated by evidence of salience e¤ects, the formulas account for all errors that consumers may make when optimizing with respect to taxes. 2 can be handled using exactly the same formulas, without requiring knowledge of individuals' tax perceptions and information set. 3 In addition to providing quantitative guidance about welfare consequences, the formulas derived here challenge widely held qualitative intuitions based on the full optimization model.
First, the agent who bears the statutory incidence of a tax bears more of the economic incidence, violating the classic tax neutrality result in competitive markets. Second, a tax increase on a normal good can have a substantial e¢ ciency cost even when demand for the good does not change by distorting budget allocations. Finally, holding …xed the tax elasticity of demand, an increase in the price elasticity of demand reduces deadweight loss and increases incidence on consumers.
The approach to welfare analysis in this paper can be viewed as an application of Bernheim and Rangel's (2009) choice-based approach, in which the choices when taxes are salient reveal an agent's true rankings. It is also an example of the recent su¢ cient statistic approach in public economics, in which welfare implications are derived from high-level elasticities rather than structural primitives (Chetty 2009 ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up a simple model 2 The formulas do not, however, permit errors in optimization relative to salient prices. Such errors can be accommodated by isolating a condition where the true price elasticity is revealed and applying the formulas here.
3 Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) analyze optimal income taxation in a model where individuals misperceive tax schedules because of "ironing" or "spotlighting" behavior. The approach proposed in the present paper does not require assumptions about whether individuals iron, spotlight, or respond in some other way to the tax schedule, as any of these behaviors are captured in the empirically observed tax and wage elasticities of labor supply.
of demand with salience e¤ects. Section II characterizes tax incidence in this model. Section III characterizes e¢ ciency costs, which is a more complex problem because additional assumptions are required to calculate welfare changes when agents optimize imperfectly.
Section IV concludes.
I Setup
Consider an economy with two goods, x and y. The government levies two speci…c (unit) taxes on good x: an "excise" tax t E that is included in the posted price and a "sales" tax t S that is not included in the posted price. 4 The only distinction between the two taxes is their salience: the excise tax is perfectly salient because the excise-tax-inclusive price is visible, whereas the sales tax is not fully salient. I use the excise and sales tax terminology to match commodity taxes, but the formulas below can be applied to any tax, including labor and capital income taxes.
Let t = t E + t S denote the total tax on good x. Good y, the numeraire, is untaxed.
Let p denote the pretax price of x and q = p + t denote the tax-inclusive price of x. As is standard in partial equilibrium analyses, assume that the tax revenue is not spent on the taxed good (i.e. it is used to buy y or thrown away). 5 The tools developed below can be adapted to analyze Pigouvian taxes intended to correct behavior, but I defer that analysis to future work.
Consumption. The representative consumer has wealth Z and has utility u(x) + v(y).
In the benchmark full-optimization model, the agent chooses a consumption bundle (x (p + t E ; t S ; Z); y (p + t E ; t S ; Z)) that satis…es
4 I analyze speci…c rather than ad valorem (percentage of price) taxes to simplify the algebra. The incidence and excess burden of introducing an ad valorem tax S when there are no pre-existing taxes can be calculated by replacing t S by S and @x @t S by @x @ S in the derivative-based formulas in Propositions 1-3. 5 The welfare analysis focuses solely on the costs of raising tax revenue, taking the bene…ts of a given amount of revenue as invariant to the tax system used to generate it. For example, I ignore the possibility that more visible taxes may constrain ine¢ cient spending by politicians (Amy N. Finkelstein 2007 
De…ne the degree of under reaction to the tax as
where
measures the percentage change in demand caused by a 1 percent increase in the total price of good x through a tax change, while " x;qjp = @x @p q x(p+t E ;t S ;Z) represents the analogous measure for a 1 percent increase in q through a change in p. When discussing the intuition for the results below, I will focus on the case where < 1 and interpret as a measure of the degree of inattention to the tax. However, the analysis permits > 1 and more generally permits @x @t to di¤er from @x @p for any reason, not just inattention. 6 The formulas derived below therefore account for any errors that consumers may make when optimizing with respect to taxes.
Production. Assume that the supply of the numeraire good y is perfectly elastic. This assumption shuts down general equilibrium e¤ects by ensuring that the price of y is una¤ected by the tax on x. Good x is produced by price-taking …rms, which use c(S) units of y to produce S units of x. The marginal cost of production is weakly increasing: c 0 (S) > 0 and c 00 (S) 0. Let (S) = pS c(S) denote the representative …rm's pro…ts at a given pretax price p and level of supply S. Assuming that …rms optimize perfectly, the supply function for good x is implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order condition for S in the pro…t-maximization 6 Although the empirical studies described above …nd that < 1, this need not be the case for all taxes. The opaque estate tax system, for example, appears to cause many individuals to over-perceive tax rates on wealth (Slemrod 2006) .
denote the price elasticity of supply.
II Incidence
How is the burden of a tax shared between consumers and producers in competitive equilibrium when consumers optimize imperfectly with respect to taxes? I derive formulas for the incidence of the sales tax on producers and consumers which parallel the derivations of Laurence J. Kotliko¤ and Lawrence H. Summers (1987) for the full-optimization case. As is standard in the literature on tax incidence, I use D(p; t S ; Z) instead of x(p; t S ; Z) to refer to the demand curve in this subsection. Let p = p(t E ; t S ) denote the equilibrium pretax price that clears the market for good x as a function of the tax rates. The market clearing price p satis…es
Implicit di¤erentiation of (1) yields the following results.
Proposition 1
The incidence on producers of increasing t S is dp
and the incidence on consumers is
where @D=@t S and @D=@p are both evaluated at (p + t E ; t S ; Z) and @S=@p is evaluated at p. Figure 1 illustrates the incidence of introducing a sales tax t S in a market that is initially untaxed. The …gure plots supply and demand as a function of the pretax price p. The market initially clears at a price p 0 = p(0; 0). When the tax is levied, the demand curve 7 The literature in psychology and economics has argued that …rms are less prone to systematic errors than consumers (see e.g. section IV of DellaVigna 2007). It would be straightforward to extend the analysis to allow for salience e¤ects on the …rm side as well, in which case the formulas will depend on shifts inward by t S @D=@t S units, creating an excess supply of E = t S @D=@t S units of the good at the initial price p 0 . To re-equilibrate the market, producers cut the pretax price by E=(@S=@p @D=@p) units. The only di¤erence in the incidence diagram in Figure 1 relative to the traditional model without salience e¤ects is that the demand curve shifts inward by t S @D=@t S instead of t S @D=@p. With salience e¤ects, the shift in the demand curve is determined by the tax elasticity, while the price adjustment needed to clear the market is determined by the price elasticity. This is why one must estimate both the tax and price elasticities to calculate incidence.
Three general lessons about tax incidence emerge from the formulas in Proposition 1. 
suppliers bear most of the incidence since demand is 3 times more elastic to price than supply. In market B, even though demand is 10 times as price elastic as supply, producers are able to shift most of the incidence of the tax to consumers because of inattention.
Intuitively, a low price elasticity of demand has two e¤ects on incidence: it reduces the shift in the demand curve but increases the size of the price cut needed to re-equilibrate the market for a given level of excess supply. Inattention to the tax also reduces the shift in the demand curve, but does not have the second o¤setting e¤ect. This di¤erence is apparent in the formula for dp dt
in (2), where " D;qjp appears in both the numerator and denominator whereas appears only in the numerator. As a result, a 1 percent reduction in attention leads to greater incidence on consumers than a 1 percent reduction in the price elasticity.
As " S;p approaches 0, dq dt S approaches 1 irrespective of " D;qjp . If consumers are su¢ ciently inattentive, they bear most of the incidence of a tax even if supply is inelastic.
[No Tax
Neutrality] Taxes that are included in posted prices have greater incidence on producers because they are fully salient: dp dt E = @D=@t S @S=@p @D=@p < dp dt S . Taxes levied on producers are more likely to be included in posted prices than taxes levied on consumers because producers must actively "shroud"a tax levied on them in order to reduce its salience.
Together, these observations suggest that producers will generally bear more of the incidence when a tax is levied on them than when it is levied on the consumers. Statutory incidence a¤ects economic incidence, contrary to intuition based on the full-optimization model. 8 
[E¤ect of Price Elasticity]
Holding …xed the size of the tax elasticity " D;qjt S , an increase in the price elasticity of demand raises incidence on consumers (@[ dp dt S ]=@" D;qjp > 0). This is because holding …xed the shift in the demand curve created by the introduction of the tax, a smaller price reduction is needed to clear the market if demand is very price elastic. In contrast, if the degree of inattention is held …xed as " D;qjp varies, one obtains the conventional result @[ dp dt S ]=@" D;qjp < 0 because " D;qjt S and " D;qjp vary at the same rate. Thus, taxing markets with more elastic demand could lead to greater or lesser incidence on consumers, depending on the extent to which the tax elasticity " D;qjt S covaries with the price elasticity " D;qjp .
III E¢ ciency Cost
I begin by characterizing the excess burden of introducing a sales tax t S in an initially untaxed market with constant-returns-to-scale production (…xed producer prices). I then extend the analysis to allow for endogenous producer prices and pre existing excise and sales taxes.
III.A De…nitions
I …rst de…ne generalized indirect utility and expenditure functions that permit prices and
denote the agent's indirect utility as a function of the posted price of good x, the sales tax, and wealth. Let e(p + t E ; t S ; V ) denote the agent's expenditure function, which represents the minimum wealth necessary to attain utility V at a given posted price and sales tax. Let
Following Herbert Mohring (1971) and Alan J. Auerbach (1985) , I measure excess burden using the concept of equivalent variation. When p is …xed, the excess burden of introducing a sales tax t S in a previously untaxed market is
The value EB(t S ) is the amount of additional tax revenue that could be collected from the consumer while keeping his utility constant if the distortionary tax were replaced with a lump-sum tax. Roughly speaking, EB(t S ) can be interpreted as the total value of the purchases that fail to occur because of the tax. The objective is to derive approximate expressions for (3) in terms of empirically estimable elasticities.
III.B Preference Recovery
The e¢ ciency cost of a tax policy depends on two elements: (1) the change in behavior induced by the tax and (2) the e¤ect of that change in behavior on the consumer's utility. The …rst element is observed empirically -one can estimate the demand function x(p + t E ; t S ; Z).
The second element is the key challenge for behavioral welfare economics. How does one compute indirect utility V (p + t E ; t S ; Z) when the agent's behavior is not consistent with optimization? The following two assumptions allow us to recover V without specifying a positive model for the demand function x(p + t E ; t S ; Z).
A1
Taxes a¤ect utility only through their e¤ects on the chosen consumption bundle. The agent's indirect utility given taxes of (t
A2 When tax-inclusive prices are fully salient, the agent chooses the same allocation as a fully-optimizing agent:
Assumption A1 requires that consumption is a su¢ cient statistic for utility -that is, holding …xed the consumption bundle (x; y), the tax rate or its salience has no e¤ect on V:
To understand the content of this assumption, consider the following situation in which it is violated. In a bounded rationality model, the cognitive cost that the agent pays to calculate the total price when t S > 0 makes his utility lower than pure consumption utility. Taxes that are not included in posted prices therefore generate deadweight burden beyond that due to the distortion in the consumption bundle (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2007). In such models, the excess burden computations in this paper correspond to the deadweight cost net of any increase in cognitive costs. one can obtain bounds on welfare without specifying a positive theory of behavior by separating the inputs that matter for utility from "ancillary conditions"that do not. By applying a "re…nement"to identify ancillary conditions under which an agent's choices reveal his true rankings, one can sharpen the bounds. In Bernheim and Rangel's terminology, assumption A1 is that tax salience is an "ancillary condition" that a¤ects choices but not true utility.
Assumption A2 is a "re…nement" which posits that the choices made when the tax is not perfectly salient are "suspect,"and should be discarded when inferring the utility relevant for welfare analysis. This re…nement allows us to obtain exact measures of equivalent variation and e¢ ciency costs without placing structure on the model that generates x(p + t E ; t S ; Z).
III.C Fixed Producer Prices
I derive analytical formulas for excess burden using approximations analogous to those used by Harberger (1964) and Edgar K. Browning (1987) . Like the widely applied HarbergerBrowning formula, the formulas below ignore the third-and higher-order terms in the Taylor expansion for excess-burden. Hence, the formulas provide accurate measures of excess burden for small tax changes.
In this section, I characterize excess burden of introducing a sales tax in a market where production is constant-returns-to-scale (c 00 = 0). In this case, the pretax price of x is …xed at Proposition 2 Suppose producer prices are …xed (" s;p = 1). Under assumptions A1-A2, the excess burden of introducing a small tax t S in an untaxed market is approximately First use assumption A1 to obtain an expression for indirect utility:
Recognizing that e is the inverse of V and using (3), it follows that excess burden is
To recover u 0 (x) empirically, use A2, which implies that
where P (x) = x 1 (p; 0) is the inverse price-demand function. It follows that
which measures the area under the inverse-demand curve between x(p; 0) and x(p; t S ). This is an exact formula for excess burden that could be implemented with a non-parametric estimate of the demand curve. A simple analytical formula can be obtained by approximating EB(t S ) using a Taylor expansion. I ignore the (t S ) 3 and higher-order terms, which is equivalent to assuming that x( ) is linear when utility is quasilinear. Evaluating the integral in (6) with this approximation yields
which corresponds to (4) because compensated and uncompensated elasticities are equal when @x=@Z = 0.
Graphical Derivation. The agent's initial consumption choice prior to the introduction of the tax is depicted by x 0 = x(p 0 ; 0). Initial consumer surplus is given by triangle ABC, which equals total utility (up to a constant) as shown by (5) . When the tax t S is introduced, the agent cuts consumption of x by x = t S @x=@t S . Notice that at the new consumption choice x 1 , the agent's marginal willingness-to-pay for x is below the total price p 0 + t S because he under-reacts to the tax. This optimization error leads to a loss of surplus corresponding to triangle DEF . The consumer's surplus after the implementation of the tax is therefore given by triangle DGC minus triangle DEF . The revenue raised from the tax corresponds to the rectangle GBEH: It follows that the change in total surplus -government revenue plus consumer surplus -equals the shaded triangle AF H. This is precisely the measure in dpdt S = 0), a plausible assumption for small tax rates. Under this assumption, dx c dp (p; 0; Z) = dx c dp (p; t S ; Z), which can be estimated empirically as in Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007).
Discussion. The only di¤erence between (4) and the canonical Harberger formula (EB (t
2 @x c @t S ) is the ratio of the tax and price e¤ects @x c =@t S @x c =@p . Three general lessons about excess burden emerge from this ratio.
[Inattention Reduces Excess Burden if @x @Z
= 0] When there are no income e¤ects, the tax t S generates deadweight cost equivalent to that created by a perfectly salient tax of t S .
If agents ignore taxes completely and = 0, then EB = 0. Taxation creates no ine¢ ciency when = 0 because the agent's consumption allocation coincides with the …rst-best bundle 10 Another instructive derivation starts from the excess burden of taxation for a fully-optimizing agent, EB (triangle AID). Starting from EB , I obtain excess burden for the agent who does not optimize fully (triangle AF H) by making two adjustments: (1) subtracting the additional revenue earned by the government because the agent under-reacts to the tax (rectangle HIDE) and (2) adding the private welfare loss due to the optimization error (triangle F ED).
11 Income e¤ects have more complex e¤ects on the excess burden calculation when there are more than two goods because the tax may create a suboptimal budget allocation among the untaxed goods. that he would have chosen under lump sum taxation. 12 As the degree of attention to taxes rises, excess burden rises at a quadratic rate: EB / 2 . Excess burden rises with the square of for the same reason that it rises with the square of the t S -the increasing marginal social cost of deviating from the …rst-best. Because EB is a quadratic function of but a linear function of " x;qjp , inattention (reductions in ) and inelasticity (reductions in " x;qjp ) have di¤erent e¤ects on excess burden, as in the incidence analysis. Like incidence, excess burden depends on which side of the market is taxed. Since a tax on producers is likely to be included in posted prices, it leads to a larger reduction in demand and more deadweight loss than an equivalent tax levied on consumers when @x @Z = 0. 
[Inattention Can Raise Excess Burden if
This equation shows that EB > 0 even when @x=@t S = 0 in the presence of income e¤ects.
To understand this result, recall that the excess burden of a distortionary tax is determined by the extent to which the agent deviates from the allocation he would optimally choose if subject to a lump sum tax of an equivalent amount. In the quasilinear case, the agent's consumption bundle when ignoring the tax coincides with the bundle he would optimally 12 The consumer's private welfare always rises with -increased salience of tax-inclusive prices is always desirable from the consumer's perspective. However, the gain in the consumer's private welfare from full attention (triangle F ED in Figure 4 ) is more than o¤set by the resulting loss in government revenue (rectangle HIDE), which is why total surplus falls with when Intuitively, an agent with price-inelastic consumption has rapidly increasing marginal utility as his consumption level deviates from the …rst-best level. A given reduction in demand thus leads to a larger loss of surplus for an agent with more price-inelastic demand. As in the incidence analysis, taxing markets with more elastic demand could lead to greater or lesser excess burden, depending on the covariance between " x;qjt S and " x;qjp .
III.D Endogenous Producer Prices
I now drop the constant-returns-to-scale assumption and consider a market where the supply curve is upward sloping (" S;p < 1). In this case, pretax prices are endogenous to the tax rate and …rms earn positive pro…ts, which must be accounted for in the welfare calculation.
Following Auerbach (1985) , assume that pro…ts (S(p)) are paid to the consumer using the numeraire y. In this subsection, I assume that utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y). I do not treat the case with both income e¤ects and " S;p < 1 in this paper. R where p 0 = p(0; 0) and p 1 = p(0; t S ) denote the equilibrium price before and after the introduction of the tax, i = (S(p i )), and R = t S x(p 1 ; t S ) denotes tax revenue (Auerbach 1985) . Intuitively, excess burden equals the sum of the change in consumer surplus and producer surplus minus government revenue (R). Let dx dt S denote the total reduction in equilibrium quantity caused by the tax, taking into account the e¤ect of the price response:
denote the total change in demand caused by a 1 percent increase in the price q = p 1 + t S through an increase in t S , taking into account the e¤ect of the endogenous price response.
Proposition 3 Suppose utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y). Under assumptions A1-A2, the excess burden of introducing a small tax t S in a previously untaxed market is approximately
where dx dt S is evaluated at (p 0 ; 0; Z) and =
Proof. The equation can be derived heuristically by calculating the area of the triangle that lies between the supply and the (no tax) price-demand curve x(p; 0) between the initial and …nal equilibrium quantities in Figure 1 . The width of the triangle is t S dx dt S and the height is t S . See Appendix A for a formal derivation.
The lessons discussed above with …xed producer prices carry over to the case with endogenous prices. Indeed, the formula for excess burden with upward-sloping supply has exactly the same form as in (4) . The only di¤erence is that the size of the deviation in demand from the social optimum is given by the total derivative dx dt S instead of the partial derivative @x @t S . When p is …xed, these two derivatives coincide, so (8) collapses to the formula in Proposition 2 without income e¤ects. When p is endogenous, part of the distortion in behavior is o¤set by the reduction in prices by producers to clear the market, leading to j dx dt S j < j @x @t S j and smaller deadweight loss.
III.E Preexisting Taxes
Finally, I calculate the marginal deadweight cost of increasing the sales tax by t when there are preexisting taxes on good x. The initial excise tax rate is t E 0 and sales tax rate is t 
(ii) If utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y):
Proof. See Appendix A and Appendix Figure 1 .
The …rst term in these formulas, proportional to ( t) 2 , is analogous to the triangle in the classic "Harberger trapezoid." This term comes from the loss in consumer and producer surplus due to the tax increase, and is exactly the same as in the case without preexisting taxes. The second term, proportional to t, is analogous to the rectangle in the Harberger trapezoid. This term re ‡ects the …scal externality that the agents impose on the government by changing their behavior. Government revenue falls by t I close with a technical remark about the approximations used in Proposition 4. The classic "Harberger trapezoid" formula requires that t is small and that either (1) initial tax rates are small or (2) demand is linear ( d 2 x dp 2 = 0) over the t interval (Auerbach 1985) . In the case studied here, for small t, condition (1) su¢ ces to obtain simple formulas for EB but (2) 
IV Conclusion
A growing body of evidence shows that individuals optimize imperfectly with respect to many tax and transfer policies. The formulas developed in this paper can be applied to characterize the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of such policies. Much as Harberger identi…ed the compensated price elasticity as the key parameter to be estimated in subsequent work, the analysis here identi…es the compensated tax and price elasticities (" c x;qjt S and " c x;qjp ) as "su¢ cient statistics"for welfare analysis in behavioral models of tax policy.
A natural next step would be to extend the welfare analysis in this paper to characterize optimal taxation when agents optimize imperfectly, generalizing the results of Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971) . Combining the formulas here with a positive theory would be useful for this analysis. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's (2007) bounded-rationality model predicts that attention and behavioral responses to taxation are larger when (1) tax rates 14 Linearity of demand over the t interval permits large t are high, (2) the price-elasticity of demand is large, and (3) the amount spent on the good is large. Combined with the welfare analysis here, these predictions imply that in markets with these three characteristics, tax incidence should fall more heavily on producers and excess burden should be closer to the Harberger measure.
Finally, the approach to welfare analysis proposed here -using a domain where incentives are fully salient to characterize the welfare consequences of policies that are not salient -can be applied in other contexts. Many social insurance programs (e.g. Medicare and Social Security) have complex features and may induce suboptimal behaviors. By estimating behavioral responses to analogous programs whose incentives are more salient, one can characterize the welfare consequences of the existing programs more accurately. Another potential application is to optimal regulation, including consumer protection law and …nan-cial market regulations. By identifying "suboptimal"transactions using data on consumer's choices in domains where incentives are more salient, one could develop rules to maximize consumer welfare that do not rely on paternalistic judgments. ; t E 0 ) using Taylor expansions that ignore terms proportional to n where n 3. That is, the formulas ignore terms proportional to
Proof of Proposition 4i
De…nitions: Let
; Z) denote the utility attained by a fully optimizing agent who consumes the optimal bundle (x (p + t E ; t S ; Z); y (p + t E ; t S ; Z)). Let R (p + t E ; t S ; Z) = (t E + t S )x (p + t E ; t S ; Z) denote tax revenue obtained from a fully optimizing agent.
Let the agent's loss from failing to optimize relative to the tax be denoted by
The gain in revenue due to the agent's under-reaction to the tax is
Recall that excess burden in the full optimization case is
Combining these three equations, I rewrite the formula for excess burden in (3) as
Using this formulation for EB, the excess burden of a sales tax increase t is
where the di¤erence operator X(t
). I will use Taylor expansions to obtain simple expressions for each of these three terms below. i) Auerbach (1985) shows that ignoring third-order terms, excess burden for an optimizing agent is approximately
ii) The R term can be written as:
Ignoring the third-and higher-order terms (proportional to n ; n 3) in EB, I write this equation as
iii) Simplifying the expression for G requires more work. First recall that the expenditure function is e(p; t
and hence
The expenditure minimization problem is
Di¤erentiating the utility constraint for the expenditure minimization problem (EMP) yields
The …rst-order condition for the EMP implies
where all the derivatives are evaluated at (p + t E 0 ; t S 0 ; V ). Using a Taylor expansion, it follows that
I show below that V V is proportional to 2 ; hence, the [V V ] 2 and higher-order terms in this expansion can be ignored under the second-order approximation. Hence, one can write
De…ne the utility gain from choosing the optimal level x vs. another point x as
where O 
Totally di¤erentiating the fully-optimizing agent's …rst-order condition with respect to p yields 
De…ning y = y v 00 (y )=v 0 (y ) it follows that
Finally, I use a result from Chetty (2006) which relates the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to the ratio of the income e¤ect to the substitution e¤ect: 
Inserting this expression into (12) yields Finally, a Taylor expansion around x 0 yields:
2 + :::
Ignoring the third-and higher-order terms (proportional to n ; n 3) in EB, I can combine the Taylor expansions above to write
2 )(t 
Combining (17) with (16) NOTE-This figure illustrates the incidence of introducing a tax t s levied on consumers in a market that is initially untaxed. The figure plots supply and demand as a function of the pre-tax price p. The initial price-demand curve is Dp|t S  0; the price-demand curve after the tax is introduced is Dp|t S . When the tax is levied, the demand curve shifts inward by t S  ∂D/∂t S units, creating an excess supply of E  t S  ∂D/∂t S . To re-equilibriate the market, producers cut the pre-tax price by E/∂S/∂p − ∂D/∂p units, implying dp dt S  ∂D/∂t S ∂S/∂p−∂D/∂p .  0 and producer prices are fixed. The figure plots two demand curves: (1) the price-demand curve xp, 0, which shows how demand varies with the pre-tax price of the good and (2) the tax-demand curve xp 0 , t S , which shows how demand varies with the tax. The figure is drawn assuming |∂x/∂t S | ≤ |∂x/∂p|, consistent with existing empirical evidence. The tax reduces demand from x 0 to x 1 . The consumer's surplus after the implementation of the tax is given by triangle DGC minus triangle DEF. The revenue raised from the tax corresponds to the rectangle GBEH. The change in total surplus -government revenue plus consumer surplusequals the shaded triangle AFH.
